Abstract-We consider the Gaussian wiretap channel with a transmitter, a legitimate receiver, and k eavesdroppers (k ∈ N), where the secure communication is aided via a jammer. We focus on the setting where the transmitter and the jammer are blind with respect to the state of channels to eavesdroppers, and only have access to delayed channel state information (CSI) of the legitimate receiver, which is referred to as "blind cooperative wiretap channel with delayed CSIT". We show that a strictly positive secure Degrees of Freedom (DoF) of is optimal assuming linear coding strategies at the transmitters. The converse proof is based on two key lemmas. The first lemma, named Rank Ratio Inequality, shows that if two distributed transmitters employ linear strategies, the ratio of the dimensions of received linear sub-spaces at the two receivers cannot exceed 3/2, due to delayed CSI. The second lemma implies that once the transmitters in a network have no CSI with respect to a receiver, the least amount of alignment will occur at that receiver, meaning that transmit signals will occupy the maximal signal dimensions at that receiver. Finally, we show that once the transmitter and the jammer form a single transmitter with two antennas, which we refer to as MISO wiretap channel, 1 2 is the optimal secure DoF when using linear schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wiretap channel is one of the canonical settings in the information-theoretic study of secrecy in wireless networks. It consists of a transmitter that wishes to communicate a secret message to a legitimate receiver in the presence of an eavesdropper that should not decode the secure message. There has been a large amount of work on this problem, and its secrecy capacity has been determined in several configurations (e.g., [1] - [4] ). In particular, the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian wiretap channel is characterized in [4] , and it is known that if the channel to the legitimate receiver is "less noisy" than the channel to the eavesdropper, then a positive rate of secret communication is achievable.
However, the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian wiretap channel does not scale with the available transmit power, i.e., the secure Degrees of Freedom (SDoF) of Gaussian wiretap channel is zero. This has motivated the utilization of helping jammers or multi-antenna transmitters in the network to increase the achievable SDoF (e.g. [5] - [13] ). In particular, it has been shown in [8] that the SDoF of wiretap channel with a helping jammer (i.e. cooperative jamming) in a wireless setting with constant channels is 1 2 . This work has also been extended in [9] to the case that transmitters have no knowledge of eavesdropper's channel state information (CSIT), i.e., blind cooperative jamming, and it has been shown that the same SDoF can be achieved. However, these results assume that channels are constant, and do not change over time.
We study cooperative jamming in the ergodic setting in which channels are changing over time. For MISO wiretap channel, where the channel gains to both the legitimate receiver and eavesdropper are known with some delay, the SDoF has been characterized to be 2 3 [14] . They have also provided the lower bound of 1 2 for SDoF when no eavesdropper CSI is available, which is in general a more realistic assumption as it doesn't rely on feedback from the eavesdropper.
In this work, we focus on the ergodic wiretap channel with one jammer and arbitrary number of eavesdroppers, as shown in Fig. 1 . We assume the transmitter and the jammer are blind with respect to the state of channels to the eavesdroppers, and only have access to delayed CSI of the legitimate receiver. We refer to this scenario as "blind cooperative wiretap channel with delayed CSIT". We show that a strictly positive SDoF of 1 3 is achievable, no matter how many eavesdroppers are in the network. Further, we show that 1 3 is indeed the secure DoF when using linear coding strategies.
In our achievable scheme, transmitters cooperatively transmit artificial noise to be aligned at the legitimate receiver in order to provide some room for the secure message to be decoded, and at the same time, to span the entire received signal space at the eavesdroppers in order to completely drown the secure message at the eavesdroppers.
The converse proof, which is the main contribution of the paper, is based on two key lemmas. The first lemma, namely Rank Ratio Inequality, is a new bounding technique developed in [15] , which states that if two distributed transmitters employ linear strategies, the ratio of dimensions of received linear subspaces at any two receivers cannot exceed 3 2 , due to delayed CSIT. The Rank Ratio Inequality in [15] led to the converse proof for X-channel with delayed CSIT, as well as a new outer bound for 3-user interference channel with delayed CSIT, under the realm of linear schemes. The second lemma states that once the transmitters in a network have no CSIT with respect to a certain receiver, the least amount of alignment will occur at that receiver, meaning that transmit signals will occupy the maximal signal dimensions at that receiver.
Finally, we extend our converse to the case that the transmitter and the jammer form a single transmitter with two antennas, which we refer to as MISO wiretap channel, and show that the proposed lower bound of 1 2 in [14] for SDoF of blind MISO wiretap channel with delayed CSIT is indeed optimal, when restricted to linear coding schemes.
II. SYSTEM MODEL & MAIN RESULTS
We consider the Gaussian wiretap channel depicted in Fig. 1 The received signal at Rx j (j ∈ {1, . . . , k + 1}) at time t is
where x i (t) is the transmit signal of Tx i ; g ji (t) ∈ C indicates a channel from Tx i to Rx j ; and z j (t) ∼ CN (0, 1). The channel coefficients g ji (t) are i.i.d across time and users, and they are drawn from a continuous distribution. We denote by G(t) the set of all channel coefficients at time t. In addition, we denote by G n the set of all channel coefficients from time 1 to n, i.e., G n {g ji (t) : j ∈ {1, . . . , k+1}, i ∈ {1, 2}, t ∈ {1, . . . , n}}.
Denoting the vector of transmit signals for Tx i in a block of length n by x n i , each transmitter Tx i obeys an average power constraint,
We assume delayed channel state information at the transmitters (CSIT) for channels to the legitimate receiver, but no knowledge of the eavesdroppers. In other words, at time t, only G t−1 0 {g 1i (h) : i = 1, 2, h = 1, . . . , t − 1} is known to the transmitters.
We restrict ourselves to linear coding strategies as defined in [15] - [17] . In particular, consider a communication scheme with block length n, in which Tx 1 wishes to communicate a vector x ∈ C m1(n) of m 1 (n) ∈ N information symbols to Rx 1 . Each of the information symbols is a Gaussian random variable with variance P . Information symbols are modulated with precoding vectors v 1 (t) ∈ C m1(n) at times t = 1, . . . , n. The precoding vector v 1 (t) depends only upon the outcome of G t−1 0 due to the delayed channel knowledge constraint:
In addition, Tx 1 is allowed to use a vector
of m 2 (n) ∈ N noise symbols , which are not necessarily to the interest of any receiver, but can help drown x in the received signal of Rx 2 , . . . , Rx k+1 such that they cannot 1 We will address the case of multi-antenna transmitters in Proposition 4.
decode the message. Each of the noise symbols is a Gaussian random variable with variance P . The noise symbols are modulated with precoding vectors u 1 (t) ∈ C m2(n) at times t = 1, 2, . . . , n, where u 1 (t) depends only on the outcome of G t−1 0 due to delayed CSIT:
Similarly, the jammer (Tx 2 ) is allowed to use a vector w 2 ∈ C m3(n) of m 3 (n) ∈ N noise symbols, independent of w 1 , with precoding vector u 2 (t) ∈ C m3(n) , at t = 1, . . . , n, where
Based on this linear precoding, Tx 1 will then send x 1 (t) = v 1 (t) x + u 1 (t) w 1 , and Tx 2 will send x 2 (t) = u 2 (t) w 2 at time t. We denote the precoding functions used by Tx 1 by f
, and the ones used by Tx 2 by f
. In addition, we denote by
, and U n 2 ∈ C n×m3(n) the overall precoding matrices such that the t-th row of V n 1 is v 1 (t) , the t-th row of U n 1 is u 1 (t) , and the t-th row of U n 2 is u 2 (t) . Based on the above setting, the received signal at Rx j (j ∈ {1, . . . , k + 1}) after the n timeslots is
where G n ji is the n × n diagonal matrix whose t-th element on the diagonal is g ji (t). Now, consider decoding x at Rx j for j = 1, . . . , k + 1. The interference subspace at Rx j will be
where colspan(.) of a matrix is the subspace spanned by its columns, and [A B] denotes the concatenation of two matrices A, B. Let I c j ⊆ C n denote the orthogonal subspace of I j . Then, in the regime of asymptotically high transmit powers (i.e., ignoring the noise), the decodability of information symbols x at Rx 1 corresponds to the constraint that the image of colspan(G
where
is the orthogonal projection of column span of G 
satisfy the decodability condition of (7) with probability 1, and d = lim n→∞ m1(n) n , and (Equivocation Condition):
We define D to be the set of all achievable d's. We also define linear secure degrees of freedom (LSDoF k ) to be the supremum of all d ∈ D.
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n log(P ) = 0, 2 ≤ j ≤ k + 1, for linear schemes, where W is the secret message and Y n j is the received signal at Rx j ; this means that the prelog factor of the equivocation rate to eavesdroppers would asymptotically vanish as n → ∞. This condition is weaker than the condition lim n→∞ I(W ;Y n j ) n = 0, 2 ≤ j ≤ k + 1, considered in some prior works. However, one can see that for blind wiretap channel with delayed CSIT our achievable scheme combined with random binning satisfies the latter condition as well.
Our main result in this paper is the following theorem, proved in Section III, which states that 1 3 is the maximum secure DoF that can be achieved using linear encoding schemes. Similar to the prior work on MISO wiretap channel [14] , one can consider the case where the two transmitters form a two-antenna transmitter, for which, it has been shown in [14] III. PROOF OF THEOREM 1 In this section we first present the achievability, and then prove the converse, which is the main contribution of the paper.
A. Achievability
Our achievable scheme uses artificial noise alignment to make the dimension of noise at the legitimate receiver 2 3 of that of the eavesdroppers. So, the legitimate receiver can use 1 3 of its total received signal dimension to decode its desired message, while the message is completely drowned in noise at the eavesdroppers. We set n = 3, and denote the transmit
The transmit symbols are Gaussian random variables with variance P . In t = 1, Tx 1 , Tx 2 send noise symbols a 1 , b 1 , respectively, resulting in the following received signals:
In t = 2, Tx 1 retransmits a 1 , and Tx 2 sends noise symbol b 2 , which results in the following received signals:
By the end of t = 2 Rx 1 has received two equations, and it can linearly combine the two equations to remove a 1 and get the equation g 12 (1)b 1 − g 12 (2) g11 (1) g11(2) b 2 . In t = 3, Tx 1 sends information symbol x, and Tx 2 sends noise equation g 12 (1)b 1 − g 12 (2) g11 (1) g11(2) b 2 , which is already known by Rx 1 , but not known by the eavesdroppers. This results in the following received signal (j = 1, . . . , k + 1):
So, Rx 1 can decode x by removing the noise term received at t = 3. However, Rx 2 , . . . , Rx k+1 cannot decode x because of receiving 3 equations in 4 unknowns, and the Equivocation condition in (8) 
a.s.
. The second ingredient of the converse is the following lemma, which captures the impact of asymmetric CSIT in the network, and we prove later in Section III-C.
Lemma 2. For any linear coding strategy {f
. Remark 4. Lemma 2 implies that when using linear schemes, once the transmitters in a network have no CSIT with respect to a certain receiver, the least amount of alignment will occur at that receiver, meaning that transmit signals will occupy the maximal signal dimensions at that receiver.
We will now prove the converse using the above two lemmas. First, we state the following claim whose proof is based on simple linear algebra, and hence omitted for brevity. Hence, using Claim 1, the decodability condition in (7) can be rewritten as
Suppose d ∈ D, i.e., there exists a sequence {f
resulting in satisfying (7) for each n, and (8) with probability 1, and d = lim n→∞ m1(n) n . Hence, for each n, by the decodability condition in (10) we have
Furthermore, we define
Using Claim 1 it is easy to see that
, with j = 2, where I j is defined in (6) . Therefore, by Equivocation in (8), we have
Therefore, we obtain
By rearranging the above inequality, we have
On the other hand, by (11) ,
By summing (14) and (15), we obtain 3m
≤ n. By dividing both sides by n and taking the limit (n → ∞) and using (13), we finally get d ≤ 
C. Proof of Lemma 2
Let us fix n, and consider a fixed linear coding strategy {f
We also define m m 1 (n) + m 2 (n) + m 3 (n). We now state a lemma that will be useful later in the proof of Lemma 2.
Lemma 3. ( [18])
A multi-variate polynomial function on C n to C, is either identically 0, or non-zero almost everywhere.
We now prove Lemma 2. Let us denote by [1 : n] the set {1, . . . , n}. For any matrix B n×m and I 1 ⊆ [1 : n], and I 2 ⊆ [1 : m], we denote by B I1,I2 the sub-matrix of B whose rows and columns are specified by I 1 and I 2 , respectively. Define the set of realizations A as:
Note that in order to prove rank[G
, we only need to show Pr(A) = 0. Since a matrix B n×m has rank r if and only if the maximum size of a square sub-matrix of B with non-zero determinant is r, we have,
which can be rewritten as
Let X n diag(x 1 , . . . , x n ) and Y n diag(y 1 , . . . , y n ), where x 1 , . . . , x n , y 1 , . . . , y n are variables in C. Then, for any
) is a multi-variate polynomial function in x 1 , . . . , x n , y 1 , . . . , y n . Note that if for some realization
by (16), we have
Note that by Lemma 3, for every
So, since finite union of measure-zero sets has measure zero,
which by (17) implies that Pr(A) = 0.
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IV. BLIND MISO WIRETAP CHANNEL WITH DELAYED CSIT
In this section we consider the setting in which the two transmitters form a single two-antenna transmitter, and therefore, Tx 1 , Tx 2 now both have access to a vector x ∈ C m1(n) of information symbols, and a vector w ∈ C m2(n) of noise symbols. Hence, the problem turns into the blind Gaussian MISO wiretap channel with delayed CSIT.
At time t, t = 1, . . . , n, the first antenna uses the precoding vectors v 1 (t), u 1 (t) to transmit x 1 (t) = v 1 (t) x + u 1 (t) w. Similarly, the second antenna transmits x 2 (t) = v 2 (t) x + u 2 (t) w. Therefore, the received signal at Rx j (j ∈ {1, . . . , k + 1}) after the n timeslots is y
. So, the decodability condition is: 
= 0.
Therefore, similar to Section II, we can define (see [19] for more details on the model setup) the LSDoF for the blind MISO wiretap channel with delayed CSIT (LSDoF k−MISO ). In [14] it has been shown that SDoF 1−MISO ≥ 1 2 . Our main result in this section (i.e., Theorem 2) is to show that under linear schemes, this is indeed the maximum secure DoF that can be achieved. For convenience, we re-state Theorem 2 below. Theorem 2. For the blind MISO wiretap channel with delayed CSIT, LSDoF k−MISO = 1 2 . Remark 5. It was shown in [14] that SDoF = 2 3 when antennas also have access to delayed eavesdropper CSIT. Therefore, the above Theorem captures how lack of knowledge with respect to the eavesdroppers CSI affects the secure DoF.
As mentioned before, achievability proof of Theorem 2 is in [14] . The converse follows a similar argument as the one for Theorem 1 (refer to [19] , Section IV for proof details), with the difference that a MISO version of Lemma 2 is used, and instead of Rank Ratio Inequality (Lemma 1), we use another inequality (stated below) that captures the maximum ratio of received signal dimensions at two receivers, when there is a two-antenna transmitter. The proof of Lemma 4 can be found in [19] . We now discuss some extensions of Theorems 1 and 2, which broaden the results to other related settings. Proofs can be derived using similar arguments as in Theorems 1 and 2. Proposition 1. In the blind cooperative wiretap channel with delayed CSIT, if the jammer has access to the secret message (i.e. information symbols), LSDoF k is still equal to The above proposition implies that sharing the secret message between the transmitters does not help in terms of LSDoF. As a consequence, we have the following proposition.
